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Both Franz Brentano and Edmund Husserl addressed sound while trying to explain the inner con-
sciousness of time and gave to it the status of a supporting example. Although their inquiries were not 
aimed at clarifying in detail the nature of the auditory experience or sounds themselves, they made 
some interesting observations that can contribute to the current philosophical discussion on sounds. 
On the other hand, in analytic philosophy, while inquiring the nature of sounds, their location, audi-
tory experience or the audible qualities and so on, the representatives of that trend of thought have 
remained silent about the depiction of sound and the auditory phenomena in the phenomenological 
tradition. The paper’s intention is to relate both endeavours, yet the perspective carried out is that of 
analytic philosophy and, thus, I pay special attention to conceptual analysis as a methodological frame-
work. In this sense, I first explain what sound ontology is in the context of analytic philosophy and 
the views that it encompasses—namely, the Property View (PV), the Wave View (WV) and the Event 
View (EV)—. Secondly, I address the problems it entails, emphasising that of sound individuation. In 
a third section, I propose the possibly controversial conjunction of a “Brentano-Husserl Analysis of 
the Consciousness of Time” (for short “Brentano-Husserl analysis”) and outline the commonalities 
of both authors, without ignoring its discrepancies. My main focus is Husserl’s 1905 Vorlesungen zur 
Phänomenologie des Inneren Zeitbewusstseins. While addressing the Brentano-Husserl analysis, I elab-
orate on the problem of temporal and spatial extension (Raumlichkeit and Zeitlichkeit, respectively) of 
both consciousness and sound. Such comparison is a key one, since after these two developments, one 
can notice some theoretical movements concerning the shift of attention from sounds to the unity of 
consciousness, and how they mirror each other. After examining the controversial claims concerning 
* This article was prepared within the framework of the HSE University Basic Research Program and 
funded by the Russian Academic Excellence Project ‘5-100.’ It was also written with the support of 
the program “Akademicheskaya Aspirantura,” HSE University, which enabled my Academic Stay in 
the Institut für Philosophie of the Freie Universität Berlin, during which I wrote this article. 
© JORGE LUIS MÉNDEZ-MARTÍNEZ, 2020
HORIZON 9 (1) 2020 185
the temporal and spatial extension of both consciousness and sound, I argue in the concluding par-
agraphs that while considering the accounts of sound ontology, the Brentano-Husserl analysis would 
probably endorse a Property View and that this could have interesting consequences for the issue of 
Sound Individuation.
Key words: sound, auditory experience, Franz Brentano, Edmund Husserl, sound ontology, sound indi-
viduation, consciousness of time (Zeitbewusstseins), temporal extension (Zeitlichkeit), spatial extension 
(Raumlichkeit).
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Как Франц Брентано, так и Эдмунд Гуссерль обращались к звуку в своих попытках объяснить 
внутреннее сознание времени, пользуясь им в качестве поясняющего примера. Хотя их иссле-
дования и не были нацелены на детальное прояснение природы акустического опыта или са-
мих звуков, у них есть интересные наблюдения, которые могут быть продуктивными в кон-
тексте современной философской дискуссии относительно [природы] звуков. С  другой сто-
роны, представители аналитической философии, обсуждая природу звуков, их локализацию, 
акустический опыт, акустические качества и т. д., умалчивали об анализе звука и акустических 
феноменов в  феноменологической традиции. В  статье предпринята попытка соотнести оба 
подхода; в то же время, перспектива, из которой я исхожу, относится к аналитической фило-
софии, ввиду чего я уделяю особое внимание методу концептуального анализа. В этой связи я, 
прежде всего, объясняю, что представляет собой онтология звука в контексте аналитической 
философии и  концепций, разрабатываемых в  ее рамках, а  именно, концепции свойств, вол-
новой концепции и событийной концепции. Во второй части я обращаюсь к содержащимся 
в ней проблемам, делая акцент на проблеме индивидуации звука. В третьей части представлена, 
возможно, небесспорная попытка рассмотреть анализ сознания времени у Брентано-Гуссерля 
(для краткости именуемый «анализ Брентано-Гуссерля») в качестве некой единой концепции 
и очертить сходства между этими двумя авторами, не игнорируя, в то же время, различия меж-
ду ними. Я фокусируюсь, прежде всего, на гуссерлевских «Лекциях по феноменологии внутрен-
него сознания времени» 1905 года. На материале анализа Брентано-Гуссерля я детально рас-
сматриваю проблему временного и пространственного протяжения (Raumlichkeit и Zeitlichkeit, 
соответственно) как сознания, так и звука. Это сравнение является ключевым, поскольку после 
появления двух этих концепций заметными становятся некоторые теоретические разработки, 
* Статья подготовлена в рамках программы фундаментальных исследований ВШЭ и финан-
совой поддержке проекта 5-100. Она написана также при поддержке программы «Академи-
ческая аспирантура» ВШЭ, сделавшей возможной мою стажировку в Институте Филосо-
фии Свободного Университета Берлина, во время которой я написал эту статью. 
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основанные на смещении внимания от звуков к единству сознанию и тому, как они отражаются 
друг в друге. В заключение, после рассмотрения конкурирующих утверждений относительно 
пространственного и временного протяжения как сознания, так и звука, я делаю вывод, что, 
будучи рассмотрен в свете обозначенных подходов к онтологии звука, анализ Брентано-Гуссер-
ля является, скорее всего, аргументом в пользу концепции свойств, и это обстоятельство также 
открывает интересные перспективы [в анализе] проблемы индивидуации звука. 
Ключевые слова: звук, акустический опыт, Франц Брентано, Эдмунд Гуссерль, онтология звука, 
индивидуация звука, сознание времени, временная протяженность, пространственная протя-
женность.
Los zorros del desierto de Sechura aúllan como demonios cuando 
llega la noche; ¿sabes por qué?:
para quebrar el silencio que los aterroriza
(Sechura’s desert foxes howl like demons at nightfall. Do you know 
why? In order to break the silence that terrifies them)
MARIO VARGAS LLOSA, La ciudad y los perros 
(The Time of the Hero)
Después reflexioné que todas las cosas le suceden a uno precisa-
mente, precisamente ahora. Siglos de siglos y sólo en el presente 
ocurren los hechos innumerables hombres en el aire, en la tierra y 
el mar, y todo lo que realmente pasa me pasa a mí…
(Then I reflected that everything happens to a man precisely, precisely 
now. Centuries and centuries and only in the present do things hap-
pen; countless men in the air, on the face of the earth and the sea, and 
all that really is happening is happening to me) 
JORGE LUIS BORGES, El jardín de los senderos que se bifurcan 
(The Garden of the Forking Parts)
If I hear a mocking bird singing for three or four minutes I have a temporal ex-
perience of the mocking bird singing, but it also could be said that I have a temporal 
experience of the song. To point out other possible distinctions, there is the song of 
the mocking bird and the sound produced by the mocking bird as events in the world, 
being, presumably, independent of me and my will. For Edmund Husserl and, be-
fore him, Franz Brentano, a distinction must be made between the experience of that 
sound and the sound itself. And, not being focused primarily on sound, what they are 
really concerned with is the inner experience of time. 
These developments have been, to a certain extent, alien to another field where 
the philosophical discussion on sound has taken place: that of analytic philosophy. 
Since Strawson’s Individuals, sounds have gained new philosophical appeal and, for 
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the last twenty years, there have been new contributions (Casati & Dokic, 1994, 2014; 
O’Callaghan, 2007, 2009). 
This topic reveals a situation of mutual negligence. On the one hand, analytic 
philosophy has not paid attention to Husserl’s or Brentano’s treatment of sounds, not 
even for the sake of exemplification; not to mention works such as Ihde’s (2007)1. 
While they address ‘phenomenology,’ they give this word a different meaning from 
that of the philosophical movement started by Husserl. Meanwhile, there is little 
mention of the debate on sound in analytic philosophy in current phenomenological 
research—albeit Ihde considers, as I will underline below, Strawson’s thought experi-
ment (Ihde, 2007, 32). Therefore, there is a need to build a bridge between both tradi-
tions and my contempt is to prove this to be fruitful. 
Within the analytic debate, there are two general inquiries concerning sounds: 
that of sound Ontology and that of sound topology. The first is focused on the ques-
tion of what sounds are; the latter is engaged with the inquiry about where sounds are. 
Therefore, the main problem to address here is the place that the “Brentano-Husserl” 
analysis of the inner consciousness of time has, or would have, within the philosophi-
cal (mostly analytical) debate on sounds. Surely, the conjunction of Husserl and Bren-
tano can be problematic, so certain nuances are needed.
Against this background, there is a major issue that philosophers of sound have 
described as “infamously difficult to resolve” (O’Callaghan, 2007, 64): that of sound 
individuation. This is the second issue I want to address: can the Brentano-Husserl 
analysis solve the problems of the individuation of sound? 
A first step to consider this possibility is to describe the options concerning 
both the ontology and the topology of sound in a schematic way. Here I will stick to 
the depictions made by Casati and Dokic (1995, 2014) and O’Callaghan (2007). 
In a second section, it is necessary to describe the problem of sound individu-
ation and what it entails, the way it is inscribed within the ontology and topology of 
sound, and the hierarchy of sub-problems it encompasses. 
After these two sections, the proper discussion on Brentano and Husserl com-
mences. It is necessary to describe what I have labelled as the Brentano-Husserl anal-
ysis. In phenomenological studies it is common to emphasise the differences between 
the authors and to analyse them in deep. Here I will go against the grain, since I am 
rather concerned with the commonalities between them and, while considering such 
commonalities, I try to systematise their view(s). 
1 A careful look into the canon bibliography (some of it cited in this paper) can confirm this. For 
instance in Casati & Dokic (2014), O’Callaghan (2007), O’Callaghan & Nudds (2009). 
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What I pretend to elaborate by referring to the Brentano-Husserl analysis is 
a common concern they both had pertaining the problem of spatial and temporal 
extension of particulars and of consciousness. Here I also pay attention to the main 
commonality of both authors: their endorsement of a “retentional model” (Dainton, 
2017)2.
After this, I turn to two theoretical movements that can be drawn from this per-
spective when applied to sounds: shifting (namely, the change in the focus of attention 
on certain issues, such as sound individuation), and the mirroring effect involving 
sound and consciousness. I have written a subsection for each of these movements.
The particular depiction I propose for the Brentano-Husserl analysis is devoted 
to sounds and specifically aimed at facing the derived problems from the ontology 
of sound that I have already outlined; especially, that of the individuation of sound. 
In that sense, if the Brentano-Husserl analysis enhances a good theory for sounds, it 
should be able to respond to some of the difficulties previously reported. I dedicate a 
section to how the Brentano-Husserl analysis would respond to this challenge.
In the conclusions, I will argue that the Brentano-Husserl analysis is close to a 
view called the Property View-1 (PV1), which holds that sounds are properties of the 
perceiving mind. A final remark is concerned with the value of sounds as an example 
used by our both authors: as I believe, from this view, what can be said about sounds 
can be said, a fortiori, for consciousness, which is a—if not the—major philosophical 
issue.
§ 1. ONTOLOGY AND TOPOLOGY OF SOUND
Ontology of sound deals with questions such as: are sounds objects? Are they 
particulars? Are they properties or secondary qualities? In recent years, the views pro-
duced to answer these questions have been reduced to three (or four, if one counts one 
of them as twofold): the wave view (WV), the property view (PV) and the event view 
(EV). Each view has its proper logical extension for the term “sound.”
WV is the view according to which sounds are acoustics waves. This is the he-
gemonic and dominant definition of sounds, and it is so probably beyond the discipli-
nary fields of philosophy and psychology.
In WV, sound properties are usually known as volume or intensity, and pitch. 
They have the logical extension of amplitude and frequency, respectively, since such 
2 Such endorsement could be questionable. Robin D. Rollinger (1999, 59), for instance, attributes this 
term to the late Husserl and would not grant its use to Brentano. 
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equivalences are a direct result of the identity statement “sound = acoustic wave”3. 
One could fairly say that WV is the physicalist position within sound ontology. 
I will not focus on the criticism to WV, but it is worth mention that, phenom-
enologically, there is more to sounds than amplitude and frequency. The main crit-
icism (Pasnau, 1999) for WV is that we, for one, do not perceive sounds as being in a 
medium, but at the sounding events. Moreover, some of the properties of waves, in the 
physical sense, do not seem exportable to sound, for instance, their capacity to move 
(or travel) (Casati & Dokic, 2014). 
The second view, PV, is twofold. In formal terms it is very different from oth-
er views, given that here sounds are not particulars, but properties of something else. 
While considering to what such properties can be predicated of, it turns out that we have 
two possibilities. The first one, which I label as PV1, states that sounds are properties of 
the perceiving mind. The second one, PV2, holds that sounds are properties of objects. 
The first one, in its more explicit formulation, would be certainly closer to a 
subjective idealist point of view and, for this reason, it is not easy to find such a stance 
in theory4. An implication here, however counterintuitive it may seem, is that sounds 
could then be private, and not public. 
There are, of course, degrees, in the extent to which PV1 can be endorsed. As I 
have stated before, an upshot of this article is to hold that, at some stage of formulation 
of PV1, the Brentano-Husserl analysis is more prone to this view than to others. 
PV2 is an interesting option because, if it claims that sounds are properties of 
the object, namely the sounding or vibrating object, it is yet to be seen which kind of 
properties we are discussing here. A possible candidate is that of dispositional prop-
erties, but that is a task beyond the scope of this article. The argument of secondary 
qualities, as stated since John Locke’s Essay, is a modality of PV2. 
Finally, EV is a philosophical formulation (Casati & Dokic, 1994; O’Callaghan, 
2007, 2009; Scruton, 2009) that regards sounds as events that take place and are 
bounded spatiotemporally. 
There is yet another way of tackling the issue of the location of sound. That 
is the scope I have labelled as sound topology, which has been developed by Casati 
and Dokic (1994, 2014). The positions are: proximal, medial, distal and aspatial. The 
scheme here is a subject-object model instantiated by the hearer-sounding. In the first 
3 Timbre, which is the other sound property, can also be characterised in a physicalistic fashion, yet 
it include more variables (like harmonic content and vibrato) that are not as easy to depict schemat-
ically. 
4 Casey O’Callaghan, one of the main authors in this discussion, usually points to D. L. C. Maclachlan 
(1989) as a representative of this view. 
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sense, the sound is at or in the hearer; in the second, the sound is somewhere between 
the hearer and the sounding object; in the distal proposition, the sound is at or in the 
object. Meanwhile, the aspatial view emphasizes one of the main problems of the on-
tology of sound: its lack of inner spatial structure. Considering this, the aspatial view 
would claim that sounds are nowhere. The latter is a stance that radicalises Strawson’s 
thought experiment of a purely acoustic world. 
So far, I have offered an overview of the philosophical discussion about sound. 
Clearly, there is no agreement regarding sound ontology and, perhaps connectedly, 
also when it comes to sound topology. 
Far from being another philosophical issue on which a common understanding 
has not seen the light, the discrepancy gives rise to certain consequences in the under-
standing of sounds. One of them is, precisely, that of sound individuation. 
§ 2. SOUND INDIVIDUATION AND ITS PROBLEMS
§ 2.1 What individuation means
Identity, identification and individuation are deeply connected problems and con-
ceptual confusion may arise. Let us start with probably the easiest of the three: identifica-
tion. To identify a sound is to be able, as a perceiving subject, to detect an acoustic phenom-
enon and, perhaps but not necessarily, to account for its properties, mainly, that of timbre. 
Should the identification go well, to single out a sound is to individuate it. Indi-
viduation, in this sense, is oriented by the identification of the particular, in this case a 
sound (if sounds can be considered as such) (Méndez-Martínez, 2019). The problem 
of sound individuation also appears in the literature as ‘auditory grouping,’ when the 
singling out of auditory objects is discussed (Nudds, 2010). 
In a metaphysical and theoretical sense, individuation is also to be considered 
as what makes a particular what it is and, some would add, how it “differs from all 
other particulars” (Davis, 2005, 292). But, following Castaneda (1975), individuation 
and individuality are different from distinctiveness. Indeed, distinctiveness is rather a 
consequence of individuality and individuation. 
Apart from establishing that an object is indeed what it seems to be or, in other 
words, ensuring its individuation and individuality, we could say that an object is persis-
tent through time if, despite its possible changes, it keeps its identity. We can also appeal 
formally to identity, for instance, when we say that “a is identical with b,” or “a = b.” 
Here, I am specifically concerned with the individuality-individuation and iden-
tification of a sound and the way this is affected by the perplexities of sound ontology. 
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§ 2.2 Aspatiality
The problem of spatiality and aspatiality (or sounds’ possession/lack of inner 
spatial structure) does not derive from the problem of the individuation of sound and 
it could be said that they share the same hierarchy while considering the importance 
of the problems of sound ontology. However, they remain connected.
Connecting sound ontology with sound topology is a way to show the problem 
of location of particulars or, if you hold PV in either of its two options, particulars’ 
properties. When one considers individuation, the problem becomes in that of indi-
viduating-where. 
The views in the ontology and topology of sound almost group in tandem: 
PV1 with proximal; PV2 with distal; EV and WV with medial. Stating that a sound in-
dividuates-in-consciousness, like in PV1-proximal, is very different from saying that 
it individuates in an acoustic wave, or that sound is secondary to the individuation of 
an object that possesses the sounding property. 
The aspatial view is, surely, more problematic. How is it that something lacking inner 
spatial structure individuates? There are two ways of individuating in an aspatial scheme. 
The first is by appealing to a pure and abstract sense of individuation. The medieval dis-
cussion about haecceity, for instance, is mainly metaphysical and does not encompass the 
problem of identification. The second solution is to emphasise the temporal features of 
sound. It is in this last option that the Brentano-Husserl analysis can prove fruitful. 
§ 2.3 Sound complexity
A “complex” sound is composed by the interaction of several sounds. A clear 
example of this is a chord or a moment in an orchestra’s performance. It could also be 
said, that the latter is “more complex” than the former because there are more sounds 
interacting in it. 
Sound complexity, in this sense, is clearly connected with SI while inquiring: “Is 
it one sounds or many?” A problem here is not to appeal to an arbitrary criterion, to 
designate where a sound is considered as a sound as opposed to another. 
This sort of sound complexity meets other typical issues in ontology and mere-
ology: the establishment of boundaries and the notion of part of a particular. A scep-
tical route here is feasible5.
5 An example of this is Peter Unger’s “Problem of the many” and the cloud consisting of water drops. 
Unger’s goal, by using a Sorites-like argument, is to query even the very notion of ordinary object. 
The same can be applied to a complex sound as the ones here considered. 
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Yet, the complexity of sounds is not only that of the interaction of several sounds 
or, more accurately, many causal sources of sound. Even a sound with one causal 
source can be complex when we observe its properties: pitch, intensity or volume, and 
timbre. While playing the guitar, or any of the other chordophone instruments that 
have a board, one can play glissando and obtain a change in pitch; in that case, one 
could say that it is the same sound as it has the same causal source6. This is an example 
of a sound that could have a certain degree of pitch complexity. 
A sound that increases or decreases its intensity or volume, with no interruption, 
like in crescendo or decrescendo, could be considered as having a volume complexity. 
In accordance to this, timbre complexity is theoretically possible, although the 
examples are not easy to describe, given its qualitative nature. 
However, these inner complexities of sound are not as related to individuation 
as to identity, especially identity through time. 
§ 2.4 Reindetification issues
Let us go back to the case of an instrumentalist. We have a violinist and she plays 
a C in a particular pitch. After playing the note for a certain amount of time, she plays 
it again with the same duration, volume, and, of course, timbre and pitch. Both times 
or both events are qualitatively the same. The question here is: are those two (individ-
ually different) sounds or is it the same sound played twice? 
Strawson (1959, 69–70) takes this into consideration: if we say that we hear the 
same sound, then we are talking about sound as a universal, not a particular. Here he 
is addressing, among other things, the issue of reidentification. 
Long before Strawson, Husserl (1984) addressed this problem in his Logische 
Untersuchungen. In that work, he considered sound, and more specifically, the musi-
cal note, as a universal. In the second investigation (§ 14), he discusses nominalism 
and the correspondence between an ideal object and a name. In that account, the note 
would be a Universal, such as red (or redness) and the note played or an object being 
red would be particulars or occurrences of the universal. 
The identification, reidentification and individuation of sounds are problematic 
when we consider them as particulars and not universals. This is more patent with 
EV. If sounds are events, such as my first kiss, the battle of Waterloo and me submit-
ting this article, and each event has its own identity as that event, with its own indi-
6 The notion of “causal source” in this view is, of course, a matter of debate. In a technique such as 
glissando the left hand (or the hand in the board) is moving in order to produce the change of pitch. 
One could say that this movement is another causal source different that the right hand. 
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viduality, then we are surrounded by a myriad of microevents, namely, sounds. There 
is, prima facie, an issue of parsimony here.
§ 2.5 Duration puzzles
Every entity or particular that can be taken as being temporal is supposed to 
have duration: life marks the duration of a living being as it is born and eventually 
ceases to exist. Should sounds be considered as particulars, the same criterion applies: 
they have a beginning and an end. But, if they are properties, then their duration is of 
a different kind. Let us consider a typical property of a spatiotemporal particular: the 
shape of an apple. We could say that an apple is almost round or, to avoid inaccuracies 
in the description, we could refer to an apple-like shape. An apple can change this 
property as it can be cut into pieces or smashed and turned into applesauce. Other 
properties, typically conceived as secondary qualities, can also change: its taste, its 
smell, and so forth. 
Duration of a particular and duration of a property (of a particular) seem, thus, 
to deserve different considerations. In doing so, the following cases, or duration puz-
zles as I labelled them, would receive a different emphasis for sound: 
a) False continuum: An auditory subject S unites, from tiny and almost con-
tinuous or adjacent but differentiated sounds to regard them as a single and 
individual sound. This could be a problem of lack of attention from S when 
it comes to the unnoticed discontinuity. 
b) The acoustic cutter: An auditory subject S constantly presses/releases her ear 
tragus, and, thus, “cuts” a sound which is, publicly, one sound. 
The problem of continuity, the continuum, was, by the way, a key philosophical 
concern for both Brentano and Husserl. 
§ 3. THE BRENTANO-HUSSERL ANALYSIS OF TIME
While theorising, philosophers rely on examples. Apart from its pedagogic use, 
examples function as reality-anchor for the most theoretical and abstract discussions. 
In this sense, while referring to tables and chairs, philosophers are not proposing a 
“philosophy of tables and chairs,” but a more general discussion, say, “reference,” “per-
ception” or the like, which can cover tables, chairs, cats, and sometimes human beings 
as well.
Moreover, some examples make us to reconsider our theories about what we 
would otherwise regard as unproblematic. It is precisely in this sense that sounds, as 
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examples, are intriguing. In Strawson’s (1959) endeavour of descriptive metaphysics, 
he wonders what place sounds should take since, if they are understood as particulars, 
they are not clearly spatial-material particulars. Along with other perplexities, the 
complexity of this case allows for the development of a ‘philosophy of sound’ beyond 
mere exemplification. Philosophy is rarely as casuistic as this. 
It is interesting to notice that analytic philosophy has approached the problem 
of sounds as an anomaly that tests them and confronts our theories with difficulties. 
The Brentano-Husserl analysis, however, offers a different viewpoint. 
Sound has, in general, a pedagogical value, yet there are two ways to employ 
it: whereas for analytic philosophy sound gives rise to perplexities and puzzles (and 
a dispute at the core of sound ontology), in phenomenology, on the other hand, this 
pedagogical value has favoured the clarification of important themes, like that of the 
inner consciousness of time. 
Is it because phenomenology is neglecting the problematic aspects of sound? Or 
is it because the aspects of the inner consciousness of time are more problematic than 
those of sound? I believe it could be both. In this analysis, the problem of aspatiality of 
sounds does not have the same role as in the analytic tradition, and the place sounds 
have in Brentano and Husserl’s works is fundamentally that of examples that allow 
us to problematize the subject of consciousness. What I refer to as the movement of 
mirroring is directly connected to this observation. 
Caught between two philosophical traditions, sounds have proved fruitful both 
as examples and as paradoxes, a matter I will return to in the conclusions.
Before that, allow me to elaborate on the label “Brentano-Husserl analysis.” My 
approach to Brentano and Husserl’s work eschews the conventional exegesis in an 
effort to think with these authors and not only about them. A similar effort is seen in 
‘experimental phenomenology’ or ‘post-phenomenology’ (Ihde, 2007). 
In that sense, I will also underline the commonalities between our two authors, 
rather than the differences, although these will not go unnoticed. 
In the Vorlesungen zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins, Husserl’s 
starting point is Brentano’s theory (Lehre) of original associations and it consists only 
of three sections. Although in that time academic culture was less keen on referring 
the sources, Husserl construes this theory from his own manuscripts while visiting 
Brentano’s lectures, rather than citing the published treatises of his mentor. According 
to Oskar Kraus (1976, 224), neither Husserl nor the editor of the Vorlesungen7, were 
7 Who was non other than Martin Heidegger, in whose work time would become the heart of his 
ontological project.
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concerned with the fact that Brentano no longer held in his late years the theory that 
Husserl attacks here8.
Also in Husserl we can notice changes. Some authors, for example, claim that 
his 1905 position changed (Kelly, 2016, 81). Henceforth, I will elaborate on a static 
Husserlian picture, concerning on a specific reading of the Husserl’s 1905 Vorlesun-
gen9; and a dynamic one, focused in the genetic phenomenology of the Bernauer 
Manuskipten and the C Manuskripten that bestow a different character to the Zeitbe-
wusstseins. If the caveat is necessary, it is precisely the static picture, which comes clos-
er to Brentano’s account and which makes possible the “Brentano-Husserl analysis” 
conjunction. Yet, as I will clarify in the conclusions, there might be enough room for 
both the static and the dynamic pictures while accounting for sounds at least. 
Going back to Brentano, in his view, there is a dualistic two-fold structure of 
consciousness that is aimed at the object of sensation or the sensing of that object: 
those are the primary and secondary objects of perception, respectively (Brentano, 
1995, 92). This is not a picture essentially contested by Husserl, what he rejects is 
Brentano’s initial proposal: that the object of a retention (for instance, a sound) is 
secondary, and that the primary object of perception is in the now. For Brentano, the 
objects of retention were “unreal.” Husserl regards this as one of the least acceptable 
features of his theory10. Brentano, according to Kraus, later modified this view11, but 
no further amendments or clarifications were made public by Husserl on this regard. 
8 With caution, Peter Simons (1995, xv) notices the way Kraus is usually amending Brentano’s claims 
on this and that and trying to exempt him from any mistake. 
9 Now, when it comes to Husserl alone, it is possible to interpret that there are signs towards this 
dynamic picture in the very Vorlesungen. It is, of course, a matter of debate to make this division in 
Husserl’s works pertaining time. These caveats will be clearer while specifying our understanding 
on the extensional, cinematic and retentional models. 
10 According to Simons (2015), Brentano is a reist in his approach to ontology and, probably in cor-
respondence with this, the things that do not exist, the irrealia, were an important concern, as they 
were clearly for Meinong and for Husserl himself. The problem, of course, as I elaborate below, is 
the identification of the past with such a realm. But it is worth mentioning that there were several 
types of irrealia in Brentano’s conception, being the temporalia just one of them (For a comprehen-
sive revision on Brentanian typology on this regard see Abella (2009, 390–414)).
11 Kraus says: “The essential thing is this: Brentano recognised, as we have already noted, that the 
intuitions of time differences that provide us with the presentation of ‘earlier,’ ‘later,’ ‘present,’ and 
‘past,’ could not be differences of the primary objects, i.e., of what is usually called the ‘content’ of 
sensation; […] he recognised that the intuition of time goes back to the intuition of a continual 
modification of the sensory act itself, a modification that is present to us as an intuition in inner 
perception” (Kraus, 1976, 225). 
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Even if we are on Husserl’s side, we can notice that the retentional model (which 
I will outline in the following section) is not at stake. What separates Husserl from 
Brentano is that his mentor does not distinguish act from content (Husserl, 1928, 
380). This omission can be blamed on the lack of resolution about the conditions of 
possibility of the inner consciousness of time (Husserl, 1928, 382). Also, as Bennet, 
Kern and Marbach (1996, 87) notice, another implication of this not-so-small differ-
ence between Brentano and Husserl is that such differentiations concerning inten-
tionality pertain rather to the noetic structure of the intentional act, than to its object. 
Despite this disagreement, some authors have claimed that both philosophers 
defended similar understandings of the inner perception of time (Dainton, 2017, 26). 
Husserl’s famous assertion that „Sukzession von Empfindungen und Empfindung der 
Sukzession ist nicht dasselbe“ (Husserl, 1928, 376) follows Brentano’s thought. If this 
is so, then using labels such as “Anti-Brentanian” (Olbromski, 2011; Shim, 2017) for 
Husserl’s criticism on Brentano would be misleading. Perhaps, however, there is more 
to this assertion than it seems. In the first place, we had to recognise that Husserl’s 
constant changes make it difficult to assess how close or far he was from Brentano. 
The Husserl of 1905 who wrote the Vorlesungen certainly differs from the Husserl of 
the Bernauer Manuskripten or the C Manuskripten. Again, this is the core of the dif-
ference between the static and dynamic pictures. 
The following section will make a consideration from the static point of view 
and further on I will elaborate on its implication. The Brentano-Husserl analysis, be-
cause of the conjunction of commonalities between Brentano and the 1905 Husserl, 
would be that of the static point of view. 
§ 3.1 Spatiality (res Extensa, Räumlichkeit) and  
temporality (res temporalis, Zeitlichkeit)
Because phenomenology developed principally in a German context, it is im-
portant to consider some of its terminologies and caveats. Franz Brentano uses the 
terms Räumlichkeit and Ortlichkeit to refer to the ‘spatiality’ of something, these terms 
have often been translated to English as ‘spatial determination.’ I understand these 
terms as equivalents of res extensa12. 
12 Regarding the expression “spatial extension,” there are interesting observations considering its his-
torical conceptual proliferation in the 20th Century. Ivor Leclercq (1979, 209) says that: “By the 
nineteenth century, the phrase ‘a spatial extent’ came to make sense; it would have done so prior 
to about the mid-eighteenth century. In fact, the adjective ‘spatial,’ according to the O. E. D., was of 
mid-nineteenth-century origin. Previously the phrase ‘spatial extent’ would have been a pleonasm; 
it would have meant ‘extensive extent.’ The introduction of this adjective, meaning ‘of or pertaining 
HORIZON 9 (1) 2020 197
For the case of temporality we can use the term res temporalis (Summa, 2014) or 
Zeitlichkeit. Having clarified this, we can refer to the exploration of temporality 
(Zeitlickeit) and spatiality (Räumlichkeit) using the jargon of phenomenology. For 
both Brentano and Husserl, the issue of finding out whether consciousness is tempo-
rally extended is the key point in their approach to the analysis of the inner conscious-
ness of time. Yet prior to this inquiry, for both authors, and this is even more manifest 
for Husserl, there was quite a clear difference between time in the physical sense, on 
the one hand, and in the phenomenological one. Hence the suspension of objective 
time (Ausschaltung der objektiven Zeit), following the principle of ἐποχή, and their 
tagging as transcendencies (Transzendenzen) (Husserl, 1928, 371–372). Thus, there 
is a sense in which the Zeitlichkeit we are pointing out has a transcendent character, 
which is the one we are considering first here.
Taking into account, spatial and temporal extension as an issue to be applied to 
sound, can these approaches meet a crossroad with analytic philosophy? 
In Strawson’s descriptive metaphysics, for example, the basic particulars he 
points out (material bodies) have mainly spatial extension. They also have temporal 
extension, although Strawson is not very concerned with this. A cat is spatially ex-
tended because it is a material body and it is also temporally extended in the sense 
that it has, as a living entity, a beginning and an end. If we follow the discussions of the 
previous sections, sound’s spatiality is not as clear. Prima facie, sounds are thought to 
be temporally extended; yet we do not know if they are spatially extended, albeit they 
give us information about our surroundings. 
There is a reason for the double value of temporal extension: in the case of sound, 
it largely depends on the ontology chosen. Most of the views I described above would 
consider sound as temporally extended (in a transcendent way): WV, EV, PV2 and 
even a version of PV1. But in PV1 there are also different stances on what conscious-
ness is. If PV1 follows the guidelines of the Brentano-Husserl analysis, as I will explain 
later, then sound would not be temporally extended; however, this depends on certain 
nuances that distinguish perceived-experienced sound from ‘objective sound.’ 
Strawson does not query “consciousness” in this way. Some of his mentions 
would imply that “states of consciousness” might be particulars, yet he is rather con-
to space,’ signifies a new meaning of the word ‘space,’ one which has now very much come to be 
taken for granted, indeed by most as the basic meaning of the word.”
 “Space” and “extension” were, in this sense, exchangeable. There is even an etymologic considera-
tion that we should have: the Latin “spatium” and the Greek “spaein,” which means ‘to draw, stretch 
out.’ 
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cerned with how states of consciousness can be ascribed to some particulars (namely, 
persons).
Consciousness, on the other hand, is not only a central matter for the Bren-
tano-Husserl analysis but for a vast portion of the phenomenological tradition. One 
of the most distinctive points of the Brentano-Husserl Analysis (in the static sense), 
when it comes to consciousness, is that it seems to point out that consciousness is not 
temporally extended, insofar as we are taking time in the objective-transcendent sense, 
as I explain below. 
The claim could be controversial if we consider the dynamic picture that genetic 
phenomenology has to offer and it might even be considered non-Husserlian. But as 
I will explain below, this depends on an understanding of the commonalities between 
Brentano and the 1905 Husserl, as analytic philosophy understands it. In the conclu-
sion I will explain how this could gear with a more general and complex picture of 
Husserl’s philosophy. 
What would it imply to assume that consciousness is not temporally extended? 
The conundrum here is that if we are aware of time, this might lead us to think that 
such awareness is also extended on time as it changes. But what we directly experience 
is the momentary present so, in that sense, how can we say that consciousness is tem-
porally extended? According to Dainton (2017), there are three models to approach 
the consciousness of time: 
• The Cinematic Model claims that consciousness is not temporally extended. 
It is made of snapshots, like a film. It states, thereof, that change, succession 
and persistence cannot be directly perceived. 
• The Extensional Model claims that consciousness is temporally extended, 
and it claims that change, succession and persistence can be directly per-
ceived. 
• The Retentional Model claims that consciousness is not temporally extend-
ed, but it contains packed codified representations (namely retentions or 
proteraesthesis) and that we can account for change, succession and persis-
tence. 
In such interpretation, both Brentano and Husserl would defend the retention-
al model. Yet, this ascription to the retentional model works insofar as we consider 
temporal extension in a transcendent and objective sense. Dainton’s model inquiries 
the correspondence of consciousness with time in an objective (that is, transcendent) 
sense. However, for Brentano, and even more for Husserl, the suspension of objective 
time had certain time to add to this. 
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As I have mentioned, there is a difference concerning the static and dynamic 
pictures offered mainly by Husserl that trouble our conjunction of the latter’s view 
with that of Brentano. However, even in the 1905’s Vorlesungen we can find claims that 
could contradict Dainton’s interpretation according to which the Brentano-Husserl 
analysis (or Husserl, at least) could meet the retentional model and not, say, the ex-
tensional one: “Es ist ja evident, dass die Wahrnehmung eines zeitlichen Objektes 
selbst Zeitlichkeit hat, dass Wahrnehmung der Dauer selbst Dauer der Wahrnehmung 
voraussetzt, dass die Wahrnehmung einer beliebigen Zeitgestalt selbst ihre Zeitgestalt 
hat” (Husserl, 1928, 384). Therewith, we could understand this as a claim pertaining 
the possibility of accounting directly for duration and perception and, thus, to con-
ceive the Brentano-Husserl analysis as closer to an extensional model. But that would 
be towards an extensional model that has a different conception of time (not the ob-
jective-transcendent) and not as Dainton is portraying it. So, let us explore more what 
does it entail to go for the retentional model. 
The first stop is the schematic model as Husserl presents it in more than one 
occasion:
   a b c d
 
    a b c
     a b
      a
This scheme can be found on several accounts on attributions to Brentano 
(Stumpf, 1976) and in Husserl himself (Husserl, 1928, 446). From left to right there 
is a line of time: here the column on the right hand indicates the now or the specious 
present, and to the left we find the past moments. Let us suppose we perceive a succes-
sion of four sounds. For the moment we are at T4, listening directly to “d,” meanwhile 
“a,” “b” and “c” have already passed: they already sounded. In the cinematic model that 
is not a problem: it is just a collection of those moments; in an extensive model the 
consciousness of time goes along with that of the temporal phenomenon. For a reten-
tionalist view, the present moment is “specious” because it contains a version of “c,” 
“b” and “a,” just as the moment “c,” contains a version of “b” and “a”; and the moment 
“b,” a version of “a.” 
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One of the axes of the discussion of this model is, for Husserl, to know what the 
expression “version of” entails. What is the object of such representations13? Brentano, 
according to Husserl, first thought that the object of the representation was different 
from the object of the representation for the present time and that those conscious 
past moments were unreal. Husserl is dubious that such a continuum between real 
and unreal might be possible, a matter that is even delicate if we consider that the 
so-called continuum is the origin of our representations of the past (Kortooms, 2002, 
34)14. 
By criticising this, Husserl additionally detects that specious time is indeed not 
as slippery and that, besides retentions, our consciousness at the present time is ori-
ented towards the future. Hence the Husserlian conceptual contribution to the reten-
tional model: protentions. 
Protentions give sense to the idea of a continuum that, naturally, had to keep 
going after the always ephemeral and extinguishing now and not only does it give a 
sense to the present, but also entails the anticipation of the future. It is not outlandish 
to say that by coining the concept of ‘protention,’ Husserl is moving from a static phe-
nomenology to a genetic one (Illescas Nájera, 2012, 276). 
The Brentano-Husserl analysis has a particular standpoint on why conscious-
ness might seem a res temporalis but, in reality, is not. This, of course, brings about 
certain difficulties: how is it possible that a “stream” of consciousness avoids being 
13 Instead of “representation” we might as well use “presentation.” This is an important issue especially 
for Husserl. As Klaus Held notices the form of the intuition implies making something present: 
“The perception of a thing is intuition, insofar as the thing shows itself to me in the presence of 
Here and Now. Intuition means having something present for Husserl, where ‘presenting’ (Gegen-
wärtingung) is distinguished from the many possibilities of ‘re-presenting’ (Ver-gegenwärtigung), 
such as, for example, memory or imagination” (Held, 2003, 37). 
14 In Husserl’s portrait of Brentano’s Lehre, he criticises the concept of ‘phantasy’ (Phantasie). Is it pos-
sible that Brentano, or Husserl’s Brentano, was utilising a troublesome term rather than committing 
to the realm of the non-being? 
 Brentano used this term in the lectures Husserl attended and gave a more elaborated account of it in 
the Gründzuge der Aesthetik. Against an Aristotelian background, he was trying to go through the 
problem of representation. That of the representation of phenomena in the past (or in the future!) 
was among the Brentano’s uses of Phantasie in that work (Abella, 2009, 266). 
 On the side of confusing terms, Husserl sometimes uses the term ‘phantom’ while, presumably, 
referring to the res extensa, perhaps one of the less unreal (or phantasmatic) things to deal with. On 
this, Michela Summa notices: “…in the texts written around the 1910s, Husserl coins the concept 
of phantom [Phantom]. In manuscript A IV 5 he defines the meaning of this concept as ‘what is 
aesthetic in the material thing.’ Thus, if we consider this definition in connection with the already 
mentioned stratification of the thing presented in Ideas I and Ideas II, we can say that the phantom 
or the thing of the transcendental aesthetic coincides with the res extensa” (Summa, 2014, 112).
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pointed out as temporally extended? What is the core of its juncture? I will address 
these questions in the following section, for now let us turn to spatial extension. Are 
sounds a res extensa? 
We have already mentioned the analytic debate on this matter. The Bren-
tano-Husserl analysis, on the other hand, is ambiguous but seems, surprisingly, prone 
to bestow sounds with Räumlichkeit. Brentano, for instance, implies this in his De-
scriptive Psychology. First, he states it in a general sense: “Every primary object of a 
sensation shows itself spatially” (Brentano, 1982, 111), and then, as in other passages 
of that work, he considers the spatial determination of sound phenomena and colour, 
(and even smell!) He does not, however, elaborate on this “determination.” 
Husserl, on the other hand, pays special attention to space, particularly in works 
such as Philosophische Versuche über den Raum (Hua XXI) and Ding und Raum (Hua 
XVI). In the former, he distinguishes four types of space: the lived space (Raum des Al-
tagslebens), the space of geometry as a pure science (Raum der reinen Geometrie)15, the 
space of applied geometry or of natural sciences (Raum der angewandten Geometrie), 
the space of metaphysics (Raum der Metaphysik) (Husserl, 1983, 270–271). Husserl 
himself seems to deal particularly with space in two ways: when it concerns geometry 
(and, presumably, that can connect with logical space) and in its genetic phenomenol-
ogy, where the examination of the lived body (Leibe) and the lived world (Lebenswelt) 
takes place. But can we think of sounds and consciousness as tokens of the res extensa?
In more than one section of Ding und Raum, Husserl says that temporal exten-
sion is a sibling (verschwistert) of the spatial one. Yet they do not fill the appearance in 
the object similarly for all qualities: „…das physische Datum der Art Ton kann nicht 
ein gegenständliches Merkmal der Artung Farbe“ (Husserl, 1973, 55). In that sense, 
sound would not be spatially extended: „Wie steht es mit den akustischen [Bestimmt-
heiten]? Sie werden in der Wahrnehmung auf das Objekt bezogen, gehören ihrem 
Sinn gemäß zu ihm, aber sie füllen das Objekt nicht im primären und eigentlichen 
Sinn aus, d.h. seinem Raum nicht aus“ (Husserl, 1973, 66).
Then again, in a text where Husserl appears to be more focused on sounds via 
the problem of perception, he seems to decisively consider sounds as particulars. 
Does that mean sounds are temporally extended? For a late Husserl it apparently does, 
and that covers also the problem of individuation: an individual and temporal being 
(individuelle, zeitlich Sein) (Husserl, 2001, 334). 
15 This is an extremely important field for both Husserl and those trying to reconstruct on his thought. 
In a recent article, Claudio Tarditi (2018) has shown how Husserl’s concern on the continuum (also 
a crucial discussion for Brentano), at first a typical mathematical problem for set theory, relates to 
his consideration on spatiotemporal extension in terms of a philosophy of perception.
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Therefore, in this case we have a disruption between the static and the dynamic 
views, which, ultimately, points to changes in Husserl’s own views. 
With consciousness it happens the other way around. For Husserl, the copula 
space and consciousness is important, especially when considering the problem of the 
lived body (Leib), as it can be found in many places, in particular in Ideen II. 
But one can keep some doubts about the problem of the spatial extension of 
consciousness. That is not the case for Michael K. Shim (2017), for whom Husserl 
proceeds by doing a “spatialization of consciousness.” His core argument seems to be 
the following: 
i) Husserl is a realist about objects. 
ii) Perceptible objects are spatial.
iii) Objects can be immanent to consciousness. 
iv) Consciousness should be spatial. 
The premises in this argument are moot. Premise i) is certainly a matter of in-
terpretation and it does not distinguish what ‘object’ means here. For ii) it is not clear 
how a unified version of objects’ Räumlichkeit works. Premise iii) is not at ease with 
i), and with iv), there is non sequitur: partitures can report music, maps can report 
geographical space, but partitures are not themselves music in the same way maps are 
not territory. Representational mediations are missing in that argument.
There is a way, however, for which taking into account the dynamic picture, 
consciousness and sounds can meet spatiality through the concept of embodiment, 
and maybe that is what Shim has in mind. Phenomenological considerations on the 
body have animated the phenomenological panorama from Ideen II to Maurice Mer-
leau-Ponty and Michel Henry at an extent that it is needles to specify its relation to 
consciousness. But also when it comes to sound, that seems to be the case. In the al-
ready cited source, late Husserl says: “Der Ton ist dauernder Ton und als solcher ist er 
als leibhafter charakterisiert” (Husserl, 2001, 358)16. 
Brentano, on the other hand, is very clear in this regard. In his Descriptive Psy-
chology, Brentano considers that physical acts are components—and this usage of 
“component” is almost mereological—of human consciousness. Such components, 
16 Such aspect is also considered in Ihde’s post-phenomenology, where he, precisely, contests the idea 
of a No-Space, as P. F. Strawson has envisioned it: “…whereas I can emptily ‘imagine’ or conceive of 
a ‘world’ of sound as a ‘No-Space’ world in Strawson’s sense, when I turn to all the variations of my 
fulfillable experience of listening I find this is essentially false. For such a ‘No-Space’ experience to 
be actualized I should have to be disembodied—but then would there be any ‘hearing’ at all? Ulti-
mately, were this the point at issue I should argue that it is essentially impossible to fulfil even the 
imagination of a ‘No-Space’ world” (Ihde, 2007, 32).
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namely, physical acts, individualise reality and they are without spatial location or 
spatial extension (Brentano, 1995, 89). In this taxonomy sounds appear as qualities 
or specific determinations (Brentano, 1995, 95), as for 1905 Husserl—but not there 
where he considers “Ton” as an individual, certainly. 
Concerned with the way consciousness appears, Brentano first states that “inner 
perception does not display spatially diverging [räumlich auseinandertrende] parts” 
(Brentano, 1995, 16) and more explicitly says: “consciousness does not appear [in a] 
spatially extended [manner]” (Brentano, 1995, 17). 
While considering the static Husserlian picture and Brentano’s assertions, it 
seems that there is a manner in which neither sounds nor consciousness are spatially 
extended. 
A word is needed, then, for what the understanding of sound is, given that, 
being a temporal object par excellence, it would seem at least odd if we denied its 
temporal extension. A first way to hold that sounds are not temporally extended, how-
ever counterintuitive as it might seem, is that as they are perceived and captured by 
this retentional model. Although we could also say that this mismatch with temporal 
extension is when considering the transcendent-objective extension that, precisely, 
Husserl criticises while suspending such notion and that the perceived sound has its 
own sui generis Zeitlichkeit. 
On the other hand, surely, sound as acoustic wave is temporally extended: hence 
the expression “velocity of sound.” Thus, we could invoke an old strategy in the phi-
losophy of sounds: what has temporal extension is the acoustic wave, in which sound is 
instantiated, but for “sound” to be “sound,” it has to be perceived. This is a preliminary 
way of clarifying why, in a sense, the Brentano-Husserl analysis could be PV1 as it 
concerns the problem of sounds. 
§ 3.2 The shifting
When I shift my attention from A to B, this can happen in several ways and 
for diverse reasons. A and B do not have to be conceptually connected for the shift 
to occur. If I was intellectually paying attention to a mereological axiom and imme-
diately afterwards I start paying attention to a cat nearby me, I have shifted attention 
from the former to the latter, and the cat and the mereological axiom are not logically 
connected in any way. One could even say that this was a distraction and, indeed, this 
is a way in which I can switch my attention from A to B. The problem of attention for 
the subject of knowledge is a really interesting phenomenological issue. But what I am 
concerned with here is a theoretical shift of attention to a situation in which A and B 
are conceptually connected and, even more, they are organised hierarchically.
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The theoretical shift in attention that I have announced is the one that goes from 
the problem of sound individuation to that of the unity of consciousness. In the Bren-
tano-Husserl analysis, as it has been mentioned, sound is only taken as an example; 
the focus is not only on the inner perception of time but, ultimately, on consciousness. 
What does the expression “unity of consciousness” mean? The term appears in 
Brentano’s Descriptive Psychology and it is probably traceable up to Kant’s Kritik der 
reinen Vernunft (KrV). Here the Husserlian formulation is closer to my concerns. In 
the fifth investigation of the LU, Husserl addresses this unity as the phenomenological 
unity of the experiences (Erlebnise) of an Ego that comes directly from inner percep-
tion.
As a conscious being, my experiences do not form a heterogeneous conglomer-
ate were they are not of something and produced by someone, namely, an epistemic 
agent. In the first sense, it is worthwhile emphasising that this is what phenomenolo-
gists mean by intentionality. We know, since Descartes, that if there is something we 
cannot doubt about is that my experiences and mind states are mine. They are, thus, 
adhered to something. This idea has been discussed broadly in philosophy and has 
suffered a lot of changes. We can identify it, for instance, in the Kantian claim „Ich 
denke, muss alle meine Vorstellungen begleiten können“ (Kant, 1956, B131–132), 
when dealing with the unity of apperception17.
For the case of the inner consciousness of time, this unity is represented by 
the stream of consciousness that joins the different “nows” into a coherent picture of 
the perception of time18. And this unity alone is at the centre of all epistemological 
inquiry as it is the one that makes knowledge possible. The major importance of the 
unity of consciousness is evident. It has a significant theoretical weight within the 
philosophical inquiries. 
17 Later on in the KrV, Kant states: „Also nur dadurch, daß ich ein Mannigfaltiges gegebener Vor-
stellungen in einem Bewustßeins verbinden kann, ist es möglich, daß ich mir die Identität des 
Bewustßeins in diesen Vorstellungen selbst vorstelle“ (Kant, 1956, A 134). 
18 How is this stream of consciousness joined or adhered to anything? Is something that Husserl 
would solve out by introducing the idea of the pure Ego (different from an empirical Ego, obvious-
ly). That such a stream of consciousness turns out to be unified by a pure Ego is an idea that did not 
appear in the Vorlesungen. In the LU, for instance, Husserl does not seem to favour such ideas, and 
that unifying Ego is more of a shortcut that appears in Ideen. For Dainton this solution marks that 
Husserl is moving to an obscure territory (Dainton, 2017, 104). But even for a phenomenologist like 
Sartre (1966), who wrote a small treatise devoted to criticise this idea, the move is not less contro-
versial. I cannot address this in detail because, among other things, is not within the scope of this 
article. For critical reviews on the evolution of Husserl’s phenomenology of time concerning this, 
and other terms, see (Kelly, 2016; Kortooms, 2002; Lohmar, 2016; Illescas Nájera, 2009). 
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My use of the word shifting refers to the realization that when we pay attention 
to A, namely, the problem of sound individuation, we soon discover that, from the 
Brentano-Husserl analysis, it is connected to a wider and more important issue: that 
of the unity of consciousness. 
This theoretical dependence can also be sketched in the following manner: 
Sound Individuation is possible if the unity of consciousness is possible. That is so 
because, from this perspective (and from the basics of the view in sound ontology 
that the Brentano-Husserl analysis participates in, namely, PV1), experience, and thus 
the experience of properties such as sounds, is unified in the stream of consciousness. 
Without this unity, it would be impossible to have a coherent experience of the per-
ceived duration of sound and, clearly, we would not be able to single it out either. 
The unity of consciousness is a necessary condition for sound individuation 
as for the differentiation of sounds. However, considering the unity of consciousness 
does not, in and of itself, shed light on the duration puzzles described in 2.5. This 
shifting is made only once we elucidated the compliance of both sounds and con-
sciousness with their temporal and spatial extension. And there is more to this than 
the shifting and identification of theoretical dependence of sound individuation from 
the unity of consciousness. Something revealed by the examination of their spatio-
temporal extension is that of their structural and almost isomorphic resemblance. 
This is what I have in mind when I use the term mirroring.
§ 3.3 The mirroring
The metaphor evoked by this theoretical movement is rather different from that 
of shifting, and this is why it might seem intriguing that the elements involved in it 
are the same. If A mirrors B it means that they resemble each other. If I look at myself 
in the mirror, I am not really looking at myself, but at a reflection. The resemblance in 
the visual field might seem identical, but beyond the reflection of these features, what 
makes mirroring more interesting is motion, that is, that the motion of A is reflected 
in B, despite refractions and changes in the direction of it. 
When I speak of a mirroring effect between sound and consciousness I am com-
pelled to describe that motion19. Interestingly enough for an Aristotelian mind-set, 
Brentano was thinking about motion while addressing the problem of time and tem-
19 Just as “shifting,” “mirroring” is a general theoretical evocation where I am not trying to relate to a 
specific aspect of the phenomenological treatment of perception. In that sense, I am not implying 
here a theory of representations (or Abbildtheorie) with which most likely Husserl would have dis-
agreed. 
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porality (Zeitlichkeit) and what I choose to be the core of the comparison between 
sound and consciousness is their inability to abide by the standards of spatial and 
temporal extension, as argued in § 3.1, when conceiving such extension in an objec-
tive-transcendent fashion. 
As I pointed out above, sound has pedagogical value as an example of the more 
difficult aspects of consciousness. Mirroring sounds and consciousness show us that 
there is a point where it seems that neither consciousness nor sound are spatio/tempo-
rally extended if we stick to the static picture and we are keen on the way analytic phi-
losophy, specially Dainton, interprets Husserl. The constant changes of the Moravian 
philosopher, truth be told, enable this interpretation. But nuances and even amend-
ments can still be made (see § 4). 
On the other hand, this mirroring effect between consciousness and sound sug-
gests that the Brentano-Husserl analysis could be thought of as a possible stance with-
in the ontology of sound: as a variety or a precision of PV1. 
§ 4 CONCLUSIONS
In the second part of this paper I have addressed some issues that, according 
to my interpretation, are a product of the state of affairs in sound ontology and its 
irresolution. I believe that the Brentano-Husserl analysis can be considered within the 
ontology of sound and, if so, it should be able to face some of the problems pointed 
out in that discussion, especially, sound individuation. 
If we admit that the Brentano-Husserl analysis is a kind of PV1, we must ad-
dress how the problems formulated in § 2 can be faced from the Brentano-Husserl 
analysis as a view in sound ontology. Before doing this, it is necessary to say a few 
things concerning my general approach in this article. 
Taken schematically, this paper may be seen as consisting of an intention, an 
argument (whose claims depend upon the interpretation of Brentanian and Husser-
lian texts), the potentiality of a given theory for offering solutions to some internal 
problems of sound ontology, and the opening of scope for major issues.
In this sense, the paper’s conclusions are located at each level of such structure, 
namely, matching with the intention, the argument, the potentiality and the opening 
of scope. And, in such spirit, this paper can be judge yielding, or not, a fruitful dis-
cussion.
Concerning the intention, I think it can be understood as that of building a 
bridge between the analytic tradition and the phenomenological one. Working from 
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the analytic perspective, it should be a matter of concern that zero attention had been 
given to the Brentanian and Husserlian considerations of sound in the philosophy of 
sound and auditory experience in the analytic fashion. This is a lacuna that had to be 
filled and, in that sense, I think the effort of this paper can be assessed positively. 
The most delicate part is in the argument, because it depends on the interpre-
tations of Husserl’s and Brentano’s works which are and will be in a perpetual state of 
agonistic readings. The interpretation I offer from their texts is that of analytic philos-
ophy, which is, closer to Dainton (2017). Yet, unlike Dainton, I try to ground this in 
an exercise closer to the exegesis of the text themselves and that is, of course, a risky 
business.
I have written this article with the purpose of glancing at some of the arguments 
brought forward by phenomenology through the lens and means of analytic philos-
ophy. This enterprise is made difficult by the tradition in continental philosophy of 
dedicating a crucial part of the work to considerations on the history of the develop-
ment of concepts within an author’s work, a matter that appears necessary when one 
encounters the complex and substantial transformation of a philosopher’s terminol-
ogy through the evolution of his thought, as we have briefly noticed in the case of 
Husserl. The same happens, perhaps to a lesser extent, with Brentano. Historical and 
philosophical revisions, in this sense, tend to pay a great deal of attention to particu-
larities and differences from T1 in which an author1 had this idea and the changes it 
suffered from T1 to T2 and the way similar conceptions can be observed in some other 
author2. I have not disregarded the importance of this analysis because I am aware 
of the fact that the problem of time, space and consciousness of time are of a major 
importance in philosophy at large and in the philosophy of Brentano and Husserl in 
particular. Yet, I have tried to synthesise this part of the analysis. 
In this fashion, I recognise the following claims as the controversial corpus con-
tained in the argument:
a) The Brentano-Husserl analysis is closer to PV1. 
b) Sound is analogous to consciousness.
c) For such view, neither sound nor consciousness are spatiotemporally ex-
tended.
Of course, I have believed that by introducing the static and dynamic pictures in 
which you can give a more complex account on how a), b) and c) can fit altogether is 
enough. And I also thought that, in order to be on the safe side, I could well emphasise 
that this interpretation of Husserl could work for the Vorlesungen but not in the case 
of the C Manuskripten or Die Bernauer Manuskripten. 
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Finally, I have held likewise that all the controversial claims can be nuanced 
with clauses suggesting interpretations and, therewith, to claim that “for a particu-
lar interpretation, sound might not be spatiotemporally extended,” which is different 
from claiming “for Brentano and Husserl, sound is not spatiotemporally extended.” 
The same goes for the controversial claim concerning consciousness. 
My contention, thus, is that these claims can be calibrated but not to the extent 
of resist a falsifiability criterion. That is, I do think they can be countered if showing 
that both sounds and consciousness are without reservations extended. 
The static-dynamic model tries to be an adjustment that works both at an ana-
lytic-descriptive level and at a hermeneutic one. It works in the hermeneutic sense by 
recognising the differences with the most advance doctrine of Husserl on time. And 
below, I elaborate how it works at an analytic-descriptive level. In this sense, even if 
the reading of the Vorlesungen turned out to be hasty into fitting it in the static claim, 
I do believe that the combination of static and dynamic features is still worth as to the 
results it can yield. 
There are, of course, some important issues, like those of the articulations of 
different retentions-protentions, and the problem of the publicity of sounds, as dis-
played by the considerations on intersubjectivity, that could eventually be covered by 
considering those contributions, but that task is beyond the scope of this work.
To delimit the corpus of work I considered relevant for my argument, I have 
omitted references to Husserl’s Bernauer Manuskripten and the C Manuskripten and, 
hence, further considerations on genetic phenomenology. This circumscription has 
the effect of providing the static picture and not the dynamic one, and certainly the 
latter is farther from Brentano. 
More exegetic caveats are needed in this sense. The static picture is historically 
coherent as long as we keep on adhering Husserl’s views to those of Brentano and that 
means the 1905’s Vorlesungen. However, the very Vorlesungen, as I have pointed out 
already, contain elements that, under certain interpretation, contest the possibility of 
placing Husserl next to any version of the static picture and, likewise, the controver-
sial claims of the argument. I do think, however, that the correct setting of both the 
dynamic and static picture is pertinent, as I will elaborate more on this below. In a 
similar way, even if we supress the controversial claims from this proposal, some main 
of our main goals remain. 
It is not entirely impossible to reconcile the static and the dynamic pictures. 
Before doing so, it is convenient to consider a mereological note from Brentano, while 
he addresses the parts-elements of consciousness and distinguishes between “distinc-
tional” and “separable” parts (Brentano, 1995, 16). Distinctional parts are products 
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of an analytic effort and they do not actually separate from the whole, as pieces in a 
mechanical device. The snap-view that the static picture offers for each retention is a 
sort of distinctional part that is tied with a chain of moments forming a flow. Maybe 
this is similar to the Abschattungen but displayed strictly in a temporal sense. That is 
how we can perceive, for instance, a melody as a whole or words as a whole, and not 
just unconnected musical notes and unconnected phonemes. This amounts to the 
very concept of “concrete perception” (konkrete Perzeption), as Husserl elaborates in 
Wahrnemung und Aufmerksamkeit: 
Was wir konkrete Perzeption nannten, ist ein kontinueierlicher Erlebnisstrom, dem ein 
kontinuierlicher Korrelatstrom entspricht. Jeder Querschnitt dieses Stroms ist ein Erleb-
nis (das aber als bloßes Abstraktum „ist“), das seinerseits ein Kontinuum von Phasen 
darstellt. Eine einzige Phase dieses Kontinuums ist reine Perzeption nach unserem fixier-
ten Begriff, und diese Phase zerteilt das Kontinuum in zwei Strecken: eine protentionale 
und eine retentionale. Jede dieser Strecken ist ebenfalls unselbständig, da sie, genau so, 
wie sie ist, nicht für sich sein kann; oder: Konkrete Perzeption ist „eigenglich“ ein Strom 
von Perzeptionen, die nach sich ziehen einen Kometenschweif von Retentionen (näm-
lich von Retentionen, in die sich diese Perzeptionen nach einem wunderbaren Gesetz 
notwendig verhandeln) und vor sich her gehen lassen einen Strom von Protentionen, die 
ihrerseits bestimmt sind, sich in die Perzeptionen zu verwandeln. (Husserl, 2004, 362)
Therefore, while forming the flow or stream of consciousness it is not that the 
static picture is wrong, but that it participates as a distinctional part of the dynamic 
full picture. Likewise, sound and consciousness obey to the same criterion and that is 
why they appear as not extended from one angle, but as extended in the other. After 
proposing this arrangement of things, how can it be linked to PV1? 
Here, I have focused on observing that PV1, perhaps not explicitly formulated 
by any potential advocate, would entail that mind (or consciousness), is a particular 
to which we can ascribe properties and predicate things of. In its naïve formulation 
sound is a property of that object called mind. The Brentano-Husserl analysis is, clear-
ly, not this kind of PV120.
This article initiates a proposal, the possible coincidence between PV1 and the 
Brentano-Husserl analysis that invites further elaboration. A more sophisticated ver-
20 Since we are underlying here the incompatibilities with transcendent sound, I should also be clear 
with the fact that the difference with sound as hyletic datum (as stated by Husserl (1928, 385)).
 An aspect to consider in such identification, and given the importance granted to the dynamic/stat-
ic opposition, is that of the problem of properties being, actually, too static. While taken as univer-
sals, of course, they could not be considered as dynamic. And what about their manifestations? Or 
in the changes introduced in their manifestations, for instance those concerning sound complexity? 
The identification with PV is not troubleless. 
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sion of PV1  is that which emphasizes the phenomenological, sensory or cognitive 
aspects in the auditory perception as the defining phase of stating what a sound is. 
The Brentano-Husserl analysis would emphasize, in this sense, the phenomenological 
aspect, that is, the sound as it is experienced.
To my view, the Brentano-Husserl analysis endorses a sophisticated version of 
PV1 as it emphasises, through abundant examples, the inner experience of sound and 
not that of the physical acoustic phenomenon of sound. After Husserl’s suspension 
of the objective time in the Vorlesungen, certainly a transcendent sound could not be 
considered as a property21. This difference is constantly emphasised, leaning on Hus-
serl’s static picture, and even for the dynamic picture as well. 
It can be observed, in this sense, that neither Husserl nor Brentano state some-
thing along the lines of: “Sound is clearly a matter of the inner conception of time 
rather than related to the acoustic phenomenon.” But there is clearly a thematic focus 
on what they do elaborate and on what they do not. 
A possible criticism of my proposal would be that a thematic focus does not 
entail reductionism. In other words, that there are studies about consciousness, it does 
not imply that such studies are part of an endeavour to reduces everything to con-
sciousness.
An important implication of the identification of this analysis with PV1 pertains 
to the description of relations of analogy, relationship, and dependence, (what I have 
called mirroring and shifting) between sounds and consciousness. This is grounded 
in comparisons and examination of their spatiotemporal extensions. In short, I state 
that:
For the Brentano-Husserl analysis, sounds are properties or qualitative determinations 
of the object (that is the way it indeed appears in both Brentano and Husserl, at least for 
the one of 1905). Like consciousness, there is an interpretation where sounds cannot ac-
count for a straight spatio-temporal extension, mainly while relying on the static picture. 
Sound is that which is perceived. Both Brentano and Husserl identify this distinction 
(although for the latter the distinction got less convenient over time. (Summa, 2014, 91)
The other properties of sound can also be understood in this way—which prob-
ably echoes a dualist-talk—: intensity and volume as amplitude; pitch as frequency. 
Finally, I deem it necessary to observe how the problems of sound ontology are 
faced in the Brentano-Husserl analysis, as well as some possible complications in the 
kind of PV1 implied in this view. The diversity of sound complexity is an aspect that 
21 Although it could be argued, as well, that the ἐποχή itself had to undergo through several concep-
tual elaborations in order to match with an analytic approach.
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could make sound identification more difficult. Many examples, for instance those 
concerning melodies, which can be found in Husserl’s texts, are related to the notion 
of change. 
We have two general kinds of sound complexity: dynamics and by density. The 
dynamic ones are those concerning sound properties (properties of properties as it 
can be now seen) like intensity, pitch and timbre complexity. These constitute changes 
to the individual sound.
Since, for the Brentano-Husserl analysis sound is always the perceived sound, 
we can appeal to the shifting referred above: what is relevant is to identify the kind 
of retention that makes a sound. In the model, we could find a sound that was A at 
T1, and B at T2, alluding to a pitch complexity. A specious present might pack both A 
and B and maybe more. The same happens to complexity by density, for instance an 
accord or a single moment of an orchestra’s performance. 
There are interesting passages in the addenda to the Vorlesungen (Husserl, 1966) 
that exemplify via sounds using melodies as extended temporal objects22. Here, Hus-
serl distinguishes between the intuition-series that makes a unitary object, such as a 
melody, and the single apprehensions of individual sounds (Husserl, 1966, 149). It is 
in the apprehension-retention-protention that a particular sound is capsuled. Con-
sciousness forms, thus, a sound as complex or simple, either for dynamics or density. 
The problem of aspatiality is one of the main issues for sound ontology; howev-
er, looked at from the perspective of the Brentano-Husserl analysis, it is because of the 
non-spatial extension of perceived sound that we can find the analogical coincidence 
with non-spatial consciousness. 
Husserl’s perspective allows us to notice different understandings of space and 
spatiality (Räumlichkeit). Spatiality for natural sciences (Raum der angewandten Ge-
ometrie) would be certainly applied to the phenomenon of acoustic wave but not be-
stowed on sound in a phenomenological sense. A notion of space in the sense of lived 
space (Raum des Altagslebens) can be more closely connected to perceived sound, as 
noticed by Ihde (2007). 
One of the most intriguing issues derived from the considerations on sound 
individuation and aspatiality was that of reidentification. Here, the Brentano-Husserl 
analysis has some interesting contributions to offer. A significant contribution from 
Husserl’s work is the idea of protentions. Protentions give an anticipation of sound 
that is possible thanks to the consciousness of habits23. It is, then, thanks to protentions 
22 A habit that, apparently, we can also find in Alexis Meinong (Bernet, 2009, 125). 
23 And, why not, maybe some evolutionary traits play a role here.
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that reidentification of non-clearly-spatially-extended particulars, like sounds, is possi-
ble. This is a movement towards a dynamic interpretation. 
In the priority shifting displayed by the Brentano-Husserl analysis, we can see 
that a concern such as that of duration puzzles loses its puzzling feature. These puzzles 
are established on the basis of auditory perception.
What really is at stake here is the issue of how perceived duration affects sound 
individuation and what are the criteria to discern the boundaries (physical or cog-
nitive, that is, if blocking or ear tragus or lacking attention respectively) that are im-
posed on duration, i.e., the problem of discontinuity.
From what has already been discussed regarding the retentional model, the 
problem of continuity would be shifted in the Brentano-Husserl analysis for that of 
the stream of consciousness, that is, the connection between the different retentions 
that form a phenomenological continuity. Now, most of the problems are reformulat-
ed on the basis of that shifting, yet certainly the identification of the Brentano-Husserl 
analysis with PV1 gives place to new concerns. 
One of these concerns is the problem of publicity versus privacy of sounds. The 
most common objection to PV1 or proximal theories (Casati & Dokic, 2014) is that if 
we assume that sounds are properties of the perceiving mind, that would allow audi-
tory hallucinations to be included in the category of sounds24. Here Husserl’s criticism 
of Brentano’s lack of distinction between act and content could prove relevant. The 
necessary assertion here is that of presence, namely, the presence of the physical cause 
of sound: the real presence of the object is caused by the phenomenological content 
(sometimes called noema in the Husserlian jargon), while the false presence of it is 
caused by the act of presence, whereas the latter’s temporality has been shaped by con-
sciousness (Olbromski, 2011, 14). 
Yet, if sounds are, in this sense, perceived sounds, what happens to publicity? 
Here, the Brentano-Husserl analysis is unable to respond without appealing to the dy-
namic picture. Fortunately, the problem of the relationship between the consciousness 
of time and intersubjectivity was addressed by Husserl in the Bernauer Manuskripten. 
Then, there are grounds on which this model can be improved.
Finally, sound individuation, as I said from the beginning, is one of the issues 
where the Brentano-Husserl analysis can contribute in a significant sense. Of course, 
in this case the shift is important. However shifting the point of attention is not the 
24 This analytic exclusion of PV1 is not distinguishing between the perceived and the transcendent 
sound, because actually the Tinnitus sound is as of an empirical apprehension. This is, as I empha-
sise further one, not so close from the phenomenological view on sound. 
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only problem. Actually, individuation per se was a concern for Husserl and individua-
tion in time would be so as well. 
An important aspect of Husserl’s and Brentano’s treatment of time is that of 
distinguishing it from time in its physical sense. We already made this consideration 
while considering temporal extension as transcendent. This implies that there are two 
levels in which time can be considered: that of its subjective constitution, and that of 
the objective world. In which of these two levels does individuation take place and, by 
extension, sound? Well, revolving around the dynamic picture and Husserl’s Bernauer 
Manuskripten, Dieter Lohmar states that: “She can perform an individuation in the 
full sense only in the objective time, because all our considerations to insert an object 
into a most plausible story of its change and movements rests on objective time and 
our knowledge of causality, motivations and movements etc.” (Lohmar, 2016, 130). 
What this interpretation implies for our endeavour is that, sin such sense, sound in-
dividuation would have several complications to be considered as a property of the 
perceiving mind. In other words, PV1 would be troubled. If this holds, then we either 
have to give up on PV1 toto caelo, in either its naïve or subtle formulation, or fix it with 
the account of the view with an individuation in the objective time and, therefore, 
not in a proximal sense. An alternative view would be to clarify that such require-
ment would hold for particulars, which, by definition, would not be properties of 
consciousness. This is, certainly, a still pendant issue to elaborate on if we keep on the 
track of the dynamic picture. Because of this sort of entanglements, the shift remains 
as an important product of this inquiry. 
When emphasising the importance of the shifting movement in this analysis, 
we could say that for each of the problems generated in sound ontology, there is an 
equivalent, purportedly more relevant, problem for consciousness. But are the prob-
lems actually “solved”? 
I believe that rather than solved, these problems have been dissolved into the big 
picture or the major philosophical problems that emanate from the philosophical dis-
cussion of consciousness. A last word concerning one of this issues is that which mir-
rors the problem of sound individuation, namely, that of the unity of consciousness. 
One of the critical issues, as Dainton (2017) reports, for the retentionalist mod-
els is that of the surplus of content: “…they generate more experience (or phenomenal 
content) than it is plausible to suppose actually occurs over a given interval of experi-
encing.” And that is an issue of individuation for the unity of consciousness, if not, the 
most important issue for the unity of consciousness.
The a fortiori turn implied in the relation between the problem of sound and 
that of the unity of consciousness also evidences the way that this theoretical meto-
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nyms or parts are connected to a whole. These mereological considerations are also an 
open-ended implication of this discussion where both phenomenologists and analytic 
philosophers could find a common ground to continue the discussion. It is in the 
hope of the opening paths for such theoretical crossroads that, in turn, build bridges 
between philosophical traditions, that I have offered this analysis on sound. 
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